President’s Woken Up

Traian Basescu seems to be the one who erodes away the fastest, as compared to the three after-the-Revolution presidents in the first year of their mandate.

In April 1997, Emil Constantinescu had the support of 57% of the Romanians. Five months after, in October 1997, the support was at 54%. A 3% decrease.

In January 2001, at the beginning of the first year of his mandate, Ion Iliescu had 59%. In September 2001 he only had 54.1%. A 5% decrease.

In February 2005, Traian Basescu had the support of 63% of the Romanians. In November he had only 50%. A dramatic decrease not only because of the rhythm (13%!!!), but also as a reality (under the percentage with which he won the second poll). The huge rhythm of the erosion is not accidental. It is explained by Traian Basescu’s behavior in 2005. No matter how much Traian Basescu struggled by sacrificing his allies, by setting up media literary-artistic shows, the erosion will go on if he doesn’t understand the general truth of our days: 2005 Romania is not Ceausescu’s Romania anymore, whether we want it or not. The country in which a person only had to say something for that thing to happen is no more. In order to reach one of his goals in the 2005 Romania, a politician like Traian Basescu, the embodiment of the best things in this country, has to fulfill one thousand and one tasks.

Like all the candidates to the Cotroceni armchair, promised fair during the electoral campaign. However, unlike the other after-the-revolution presidents, he thought it would be righteous for him to keep at least some of these promises. Therefore, right from the beginning, he had a spectacular involvement in the political environment, suggesting a new kind of President more similar to a Prime Minister. After a close victory in the electoral elections, the new President issued several spectacular movements, which were clearly anti-constitutional: the blackmailing of HPR (the Humanist Party of Romania) and DUHR (the Democrat Union of the Hungarians in Romania) in order to modify the majority given by the poll, and giving opinions about certain political parties.

His actions and sayings, and especially the firm voice, which rejected the idea of negotiations, made a lot of people believe Ceausescu had risen from the dead. They finally had their dictator from the crowd, an Averescu from the seas. This is the explanation for the trust leap from 51% (which he obtained in the elections) to the 63% in February. 12% more, as compared to the 3% of Emil Constantinescu, whereas Iliescu had dropped from 64% to 59%.

The freedom of shooting the Constitution was apparent. Traian Basescu had in February 2005 some great advantages:
a) several state institutions intimidated;
b) SDP (the Social Democratic Party) was stunned like it had seen a snake;
c) NLP (the National Liberal Party) were led by a ginger Tariceanu;
d) a moment in which his saying hadn’t passed the test of life.

All these advantages disappeared step-by-step. The state institutions realized Romania was a democratic country in which the President hadn’t become President because of a military coup d’etat. The country hadn’t become the dictatorship of one man overnight. It had remained a democratic country. SDP had woken up. NLP found the resources to overcome Cotroceni. Traian Basescu was used to seeing anything he said turn into fact. Now, he was talking by himself. With a galactic self-confidence, Traian Basescu took too much time to realize the mutations in the real life.

He continued talking and acting like he would have been not the President of a Constitution with severe constrains, but the President of a Constitution which he rewrites every morning, depending on his after shave mood. In the meantime, he started to show that he adapts his political strategy to the Romanian state. A political strategy in which, before saying anything, the President wants to see if it is possible. This strategy might lead to smaller percentage as compared to the one in the first months.
A smaller, but a safer percentage.