Standing Between the Past and the Future

The revolutions of 1989 left behind an intellectual and moral legacy which should not be forgotten. A decade and a half passed since a swirl of events led to the demise of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. When analyzing these past 15years one must constantly recall which the starting point was. The revolutions of 1989 brought to a halt the social engineering experiments inspired by the Leninist utopia and allowed for democratic forces, market economy and civil society to be born again. During the past 15 years people equally held noble dreams of social justice and equality, on the one hand, and experienced frustrations, neurosis and painful disappointment, on the other hand. Also during this time free and fair elections occurred several times in many of these countries, but their results were not always fulfilling the expectations of the anti-communist camp.
Civic advocacy, so vigorous at the beginning of the 90s, also lost its ability to bring people together.

On a positive note, the popular sovereignty replaced the monopole on power held previously by the self-proclaimed "forward thinking proletariat." The rule of one valid idea only, that of Leninism, came to a close. Imperfect as it is, the rule of law is settling the every day life in all these societies. Though democratic appearances and rhetoric are undoubtedly present, true development of democratic values and a political culture founded on tolerance are still uncertain. Let us not forget that freedom means always that forces opposing it are also free to act.

The post-communist scene is still haunted by pre-modern ideological phantoms, like the tribal collectivism, the clerical fundamentalism and the ethnocentric populism. Cynicism and contempt towards intellectuals are paramount. Though the memory of the recent historical past is fresh and constantly brought up in public debates, the public discourse is still marred by self-pity and self-glorification at the expense of clear analysis on the past. This time the acclaimed privatization turned more often than not into a smoke-screen used by old elites revamped into new ones for plundering the economic resources.

On the other hand, getting NATO and EU membership was only a dream 15 years ago, but a radically changed reality now. Nationalism and isolationism lost ground, though there still are strong forces which oppose the integration into these structures.

The well-justified whish to recognize the pre-communist and communist past for what they were often turned into demagoguery and new forms of historical Manichaeism.
In other words, the post-communist era is one of confusion and uncertainties, where democratic forces are constantly confronted by forces which loathe pluralism. It is no point in wasting time with sterile lament. All these developments are normal, given the huge corruption which was a trade-mark of communism in its last years of existence.
For false expectations to end is again normal in a post-revolutionary time.
From a historical view point, all major social upheavals are followed by high expectations which are later replaced by recriminations of treason.

Here stays the core issue: some former communist states managed to arrive at new political and institutional structures which are a credible synthesis of legality and legitimacy. In other states, however, this social contract was constantly undermined by the regrouping at the helm of the former communist oligarchic nomenclature. Corruption in various degrees of development seems to mare all these states.

Using the experience of the Central and Eastern Europe, political scientists speak of two models of transition from Leninist authoritarianism to the "open society" Karl R. Popper spoke of.
This is not to say that transitions turned out to be an absolute success in some countries, like those in the north, or an absolute failure in others, like those in the south-east.
It is too early to draw a line.
No transition was totally smooth, but one cannot leave aside such significant differences like various speeds, political will and orientation between countries like, for instance, the Czech Republic and Romania, particularly prior to 1996.

Still, these differences of choices made and transformation rhythms adopted should not be the paramount criteria.
Cultural legacies, though important, should not turn either into a given that will fatally predetermine the future of the respective countries.
Political cultures evolve and the role of political and economic elites is to surpass the paralysis induced by stereotypes. It is clear that the future still holds a lot of surprises and that the new democracies have a lot of hurdles to surpass in order to arrive at a viable civil society and at a prosperous economy.
No matter the traits which make "the post-communist nightmare" of the emerging societies, as Vaclav Havel said, one thing is certain: the time of unanimously accepting an official definition of what human happiness is about is over.